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AMICUS ADVOCACY
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
PROFESSORS IN LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORP. V. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC.
EDITOR'S FOREWORD
The issue dealt with in this amici curiae brief is the balancing of
the two Congressional mandates, set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b),
that must be considered when adjudicating the infringement of
computer programs. This balance requires the protection of
original expression, but does not permit the extension of that
protection to the abstract ideas, procedures, processes, systems and
methods of operation that might be contained in the computer
program.
The United States District Court which first heard the case of
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. ruled that
the menu command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 was protectable. The
court, construing § 102(b) narrowly, decided that only the abstract
elements of computer programs were excluded from the scope of
copyright protection. The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit rejected the District Court's conclusions, finding that
constituent elements of operation are not protected by § 102(b).
The First Circuit, however, failed to offer any real guidance on how
to distinguish the protectable expression from the unprotectable
methods of operation.
This brief was filed in support of the defendant-respondent before
the United States Supreme Court by thirty-four professors who
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teach and write about copyright law at law schools around the
country. The Supreme Court deadlocked four-four (Justice Stevens
took no part in the consideration or opinion), thereby affirming the
First Circuit in a January 16, 1996, per curiam opinion.
This brief is of particular importance after the failure of the
Supreme Court to render a decisive opinion. The issue of the
copyrightability of computer programs is of tremendous importance,
not only to professors and students of intellectual property law, but
also to practioners and businesses. This brief offers guidance in
reconciling the two conflicting Congressional mandates, aiding
scholars and practitioners in understanding the proper approach to
determining the copyrightability of computer programs.
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No. 94-2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
LoTus DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
V.
BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW PROFESSORS
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
I. INTERESTS OF AMICI
This brief amicus curiae is submitted by thirty-four professors
who teach and write about copyright law at accredited law schools
in the United States.' None of the signatories to this amicus brief
' They include: Professors Keith Aoki, University of Oregon School of Law, Stephen R.
Barnett, University of California at Berkeley School of Law, Ralph S. Brown, Yale Law
School, Dan L. Burk, Seton Hall University School of Law, Stephen L. Carter, Yale Law
School, Margaret Chon, Syracuse University College of Law, Amy B. Cohen, Western New
England College School of Law, Julie E. Cohen, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Paul
J. Heald, University of Georgia School of Law, Peter A. Jaszi, American University,
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has an interest in either party or in the outcome of this case except
to the extent that this case will have an important impact on the
development of copyright law and principles and on the delicate
balance between innovation and competition that intellectual
property law seeks to maintain. The consent of the attorneys for
both parties to file this brief has been obtained. The signatories to
this brief exercised complete control over its editorial contents;
Borland helped to defray the costs of printing this brief.
This brief sets forth a number of principles that we, as profes-
sors who teach and write about copyright law, believe should be
considered in determining the proper scope of copyright protection
for computer programs and their user interfaces. Amici do not hold
identical views on all issues arising from the application of
copyright law to computer programs. There are some among us
who would urge the Court to resolve the dispute on one or a few of
the following grounds:
(1) a menu command hierarchy is too abstract an element of a
computer program to be protectable by copyright law under 17
U.S.C. § 102(b), see Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521-22
(9th Cir. 1990);
(2) a menu command hierarchy is unprotectable under § 102(b)
as a constituent element of a method of operating a computer to
perform spreadsheet functions, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Washington College of Law, Beryl Jones, Brooklyn Law School, John A- Kidwell, University
of Wisconsin Law School, Edmund W. Kitch, University of Virginia Law School, Robert
Kreiss, University of Dayton School of Law, Roberta R. Kwall, DePaul University College of
Law, Leslie Kurtz, University of California at Davis School of Law, David L. Lange, Duke
University School of Law, Mark A. Lemley, University of Texas School of Law, Marshall
Leaffer, University of Toledo College of Law, Jessica Litman, Wayne State University Law
School, Charles R. McManis, Washington University School of Law, Neil Netanel, University
of Texas School of Law, L. Ray Patterson, University of Georgia School of Law, Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Villanova Law School, David G. Post, Georgetown University Law Center,
Jerome H. Reichman, Vanderbilt Law School, David A. Rice, Rutgers, The State University
of New Jersey, S.I. Newhouse Center for Law & Justice, Pamela Samuelson, Cornell Law
School, David J. Seipp, Boston University School of Law, David E. Shipley, University of
Kentucky College of Law, Lionel S. Sobel, Loyola Law School, Lloyd Weinreb, Harvard Law
School, Alfred C. Yen, Boston College Law School, and Diane L. Zimmerman, New York
University School of Law.
114 [Vol. 3:103
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Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), Pet. App. 14a-16a
(Borland), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995);
(3) the menu command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 is unprotectable
under § 102(b) as "a fundamental part of the functionality" of the
Lotus macro system, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990), Pet. App. 229a
(Paperback);
(4) the menu command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 is an insepara-
ble part of a language for constructing macros, and languages are
uncopyrightable under § 102(b), see, for example, Brief English
Systems, Inc. v. Owens, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283
U.S. 858 (1931);
(5) the menu command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 is unprotectable
by copyright law under § 102(b) because it operates as a program-
to-program interface in relation to the execution of macros, and is,
therefore, among the elements of the Lotus program whose design
was constrained by external factors, see Computer Associates Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-710 (2d Cir. 1992);
(6) the menu command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 is unprotectable
by copyright law under § 102(b) because it is an inseparable part
of the behavior of the Lotus program which is an unprotectable
process, see Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1992); or
(7) when user interfaces of computer programs lie closer to the
functional than to the aesthetic end of the spectrum of potential
expressiveness, as the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface does, courts
should employ a virtual identity standard in judging copyright
infringement, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc., 35 F.3d
1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
1995] 115
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Even so, we agree that the traditional principles of copyright law
set forth in the remainder of this brief should be employed in
judging the scope of copyright protection available to the Lotus 1-2-
3 menu command hierarchy in the context of this case.
1. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are two Congressional mandates courts must heed in
judging copyright infringement in cases involving computer
programs: (1) to protect original expression in computer programs
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and (2) not to protect abstract ideas or
constituent elements of procedures, processes, systems and methods
of operation embodied in programs, id. at § 102(b).
Congress had computer programs in mind when it enacted §
102(b) in 1976. Congress added this provision out of concern that
without it, some software developers might attempt to claim
copyright protection for commercially valuable methods or processes
embodied in programs when all Congress intended to protect was
original expression in program texts.
Section 102(b) codifies the principal holding of Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879), that the constituent elements of a useful art,
such as a bookkeeping system or a procedure for treating a disease,
are unprotectable by copyright law, even when embodied in an
original work of authorship that qualifies for copyright protection.
In keeping with the Supreme Court's holding in Baker, § 102(b)
excludes from the scope of copyright protection not only abstract
elements of works, such as ideas, concepts, principles and discover-
ies, but also constituent elements of "procedure[s], process[es],
system[s], [and] method[s] of operation.., embodied in [a] work."
Id.
An important reason for excluding the constituent elements of
processes and methods from the scope of copyright law is, as Baker
noted, to avoid disrupting the competition policy principles of
patent law which would occur if a court allowed an author to use
copyright law to protect elements of his or her work that should be
protected, if at all, by patent law. Unlike conventional literary
[Vol. 3:103116
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works, computer programs contain many components that are
potentially patentable. It is, thus, appropriate for courts to filter
out not only abstractions, but also constituent elements of useful
processes and methods of operation before making a comparison of
two computer programs for the purpose of determining whether
infringement has occurred.
If computer programs need more protection against competitive
imitation than copyright, supplemented by patent and trade secrecy
law, can provide, software developers should seek additional legal
protection for computer programs from Congress. Even though
incentive-based arguments for extending copyright law to reach all
commercially valuable aspects of computer programs may have
some appeal, adopting such a rule would ultimately have "a
corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of copyright doc-
trine." Altai, 982 F.2d at 712.
ARGUMENT
M. COPYRIGHT LAW EXCLUDES NOT JUST
ABSTRACT IDEAS, BUT ALSO CONSTIT-
UENT ELEMENTS OF METHODS AND
SYSTEMS, FROM THE SCOPE OF PRO-
TECTION AVAILABLE TO ORIGINAL
WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP.
There are two Congressional mandates that courts must heed
when judging infringement in computer program cases. Courts
must protect original expression in programs under 17 U.S.C. §
102(a), but must not extend protection to abstract ideas or to
procedures, processes, systems, and methods of operation in
programs, id. at § 102(b).
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals in this case
has satisfactorily reconciled these two mandates. The District
Court viewed § 102(b) too narrowly by regarding it as excluding
from the scope of copyright only abstract elements of programs.
See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 80, 91
(D. Mass. 1990), Pet. App. 167a (Borland I) (" '[p]rocess,' like 'idea,'
1995] 117
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is an abstraction.. ."). The Court of Appeals correctly rejected this
interpretation of § 102(b) on the ground that constituent elements
of methods of operation are unprotectable under § 102(b). Borland,
49 F.3d at 816 (1st Cir.), Pet. App. 16a-18a. However, the Court of
Appeals did not provide much guidance about how to distinguish
protectable expression from unprotectable methods of operation.
This brief will offer some guidance about how to reconcile the two
Congressional mandates.
A. Section 102(b), Which Excludes Methods Of Opera-
tion As Well As Abstract Ideas From the Scope of
Copyright Protection, Was Intended To Preclude
Copyright Protection For Methods Embodied In
Computer Programs.
Section 102(b) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code provides: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
The legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress
had computer programs in mind when adopting it and meant for it
to limit the scope of copyright protection available for computer
programs. During legislative hearings leading up to enactment of
the Copyright Act of 1976, concerns had been expressed about the
need for such a provision so that copyright would not overprotect
computer programs.' Both the House and Senate Committee
reports plainly state:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer
programs should extend protection to the methodology or
processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the
'writing' expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among
other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer pro-
'Hearings on S. 597 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1967).
118 [Vol. 3:103
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss1/4
LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
gram, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of copyright law.3
The legislative history of section 102(b) also indicates that the
provision was intended to codify a long line of copyright cases,
beginning with Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, that had held that
constituent elements of systems, processes, and the like were
beyond the scope of copyright protection available to an original
work of authorship.4 The Final Report of the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) cited
§ 102(b) and functional writing cases such as Baker and Continen-
tal Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958) as among the sources of guidance for courts
judging copyright infringement claims involving computer pro-
grams.8
B. Under Baker v. Selden, Copyright Protection Is
Unavailable To Constituent Elements of Methods
and Systems Embodied In a Protected Work.
Courts sometimes describe the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, as a case about the idea/expression
distinction. In Paperback, for example, the District Court described
Baker v. Selden as having held that "the text of a book describing
a special method of double-entry accounting on paper spreadsheets
... was copyrightable expression, but that the ... idea of this
particular kind of double-entry bookkeeping, was not." Paperback,
740 F. Supp. at 55, Pet. App. 207a-208a; Borland 1, 788 F. Supp. at
90-93, Pet. App. 164a-172a.
3 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
5659, 5670 and S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) (emphasis added).
4 Id. (indicating an intent to restate the case law). Among the cases regarding section
102(b) as codifying the principal holding of Baker v. Selden are NEC v. Intel Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1989) and Signo Trading Int'l v. Gordon, 535 F.
Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
a Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works 18-23 (1979). Congress relied on the CONTU Report in enacting the amendments to
copyright law that defined "computer program" (17 U.S.C. § 101) and provided for some
special rules for programs (17 U.S.C. § 117), thereby giving the report a measure of
Congressional imprimatur. See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d at 703 (deferring to CONTU Report).
1995] 119
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This characterization of Baker misses the forest for the trees.
Baker v. Selden is not principally a case about the unprotectability
of abstract ideas,6 as is evident from the Court's very different
statement of the basis of its decision. The Court held that Selden's
copyright protected his "explanation" of the useful art described in
the work, but not the "useful art" itself. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
The bookkeeping system, as reflected in the particular selection and
arrangement of columns and headings constituting the sample
ledger sheets in Selden's book, was beyond the scope of copyright.
"[T]he mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the
exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged
as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book."
Id. at 107.7
The Court explained that Selden's copyright no more gave him
an exclusive right to the bookkeeping system than the copyright on
a book about the composition and use of medicines would give its
author an exclusive right to the medicines discussed in the book.
Id. at 102. Selden's claim had seemed plausible because the useful
art in that case was embodied in a writing, whereas most useful
arts are embodied in wood, metal, or stone. Id. at 105. However,
"the principle is the same in all [cases]," said the Court. "The
description of the [useful] art in a book, though entitled to the
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the
art itself." Id.
This statement of the rule in Baker makes clear what is
sometimes obscured by shorthand characterizations of Baker as
concerned with the idea/expression distinction: Baker is fundamen-
tally a case about the unprotectability of the functional content
a The idea/expression distinction as related to abstractions predates Baker v. Selden. See,
e.g., J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of
Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 693
n.288 (1989). Those who look to Baker v. Selden as the case first enunciating the
idea/expression distinction are misinformed about copyright history.
' Although Baker's competing ledger sheets were somewhat different than Selden's in
their selection and arrangement of columns and headings, the above-quoted statement makes
clear that the Court would have ruled no differently had Baker used identical ledger sheets.
See also Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 64 (1967) ("the [Baker] privilege
extends to exact copies").
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embodied in copyrighted works and the right of others to copy that
content in order to make use of it.' In reliance on Baker, a long
line of copyright cases have held that constituent elements of
methods, systems and processes are beyond the scope of copyright
protection. See, e.g., Brief English, 48 F.2d 555 (shorthand system
not protectable by copyright); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (system for teaching
problem-solving techniques not protectable by copyright law); Kern
River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952 (1990) (design for gas pipeline held
unprotectable by copyright law); and Taylor Instrument Cos. v.
Fawley Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
785 (1944) (temperature recording system held unprotectable by
copyright law). It is this aspect of Baker v. Selden that is now
codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
To speak of Baker v. Selden as a case that is only concerned with
the unprotectability of abstract ideas is to miss the main point of
the case.
C. Many Other Recent Computer Program Cases Have
Applied Section 102(b) and Precedents Such As
Baker v. Selden To Exclude Constituent Elements
of Methods and Processes From the Scope of
Copyright.
In Altai, 982 F.2d at 704, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
described computer programs as having an "essentially utilitarian
nature" which must be taken into account when judging infringe-
ment in computer program cases. It looked to Baker v. Selden as
the "doctrinal starting point" in cases involving copyright in
process-oriented texts, such as computer programs. Id.; see also
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th
Cir. 1992) (describing computer programs as in essence, utilitarian
8 As this Court observed in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340, 350 (1991), the ability of second comers to appropriate unprotectable material from
copyrighted works is not an unfair or unfortunate consequence of copyright law, but rather
"the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art."
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articles and looking to Baker as a key precedent for judging
infringement as to works having "strong functional elements"). In
line with Baker v. Selden and its progeny, many cases involving
computer programs have excluded from the scope of copyright
protection available to these works constituent elements of
procedures, processes, systems, and methods of operation embodied
in them.
Sometimes the detailed program components held to be unpro-
tectable under § 102(b) have been parts of a user interface. See,
e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1006,
1038 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (particularized methods for present-
ing different views of objects and for presenting dialog boxes when
selecting menu items); Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 521-22 (spread-
sheet command structure). Sometimes the methods and systems
held unprotectable under § 102(b) have been embedded in the text
of the program. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 845 (10th Cir. 1993) (algorithm embodied in
program); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522 (particularized requirements for
achieving compatibility). Still other times, the process that courts
have regarded as unprotectable under § 102(b) has been a pro-
gram's functional behavior, that is, the results generated when
program instructions are executed. See, e.g., Altai, 775 F. Supp. at
560 and Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836.
While the boundary between protectable expression and
unprotectable method has not always shimmered with clarity in
these cases, none of these courts shied away from identifying
methods and processes as unprotectable elements of copyrighted
programs under § 102(b) on the ground that if they regarded this
or that element of a program as an unprotectable method or
process, such a ruling would substantially undermine the availabili-
ty of copyright protection for computer programs.
D. The Court of Appeals Was Correct In Concluding
That The "Patterns of Abstractions" Approach Is
Not The Only Method Of Judging Infringement In
Computer Program Cases.
[Vol. 3:103
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Although courts have been making progress in distinguishing
protectable from unprotectable elements in computer programs on
a case-by-case basis, the task can be very difficult, as can be seen
from the prodigious effort undertaken by the District Court in this
case to reconcile Baker v. Selden with the "patterns of abstractions"
approach to determining infringement in copyright cases derived
from Judge Learned Hand's decision in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 902
(1931). The District Court ultimately decided that Baker v. Selden
had been supplanted by the Nichols "abstractions" approach.
Borland I, 788 F. Supp. at 92-93, Pet. App. 170a. This led the
District Court to construct a test for judging the copyrightability of
the Lotus command hierarchy focused on the Nichols abstractions
approach.9 Id. at 90.
9 To illustrate differences between the District Court's analysis in the Borland opinions
and the Supreme Court's analysis in Baker v. Selden, we think it instructive to apply the
District Court's "copyrightability" test to the facts of Baker.
The first step of the District Court's method of analysis involves construction of a hierarchy
of abstractions for the aspect of the work whose "copyrightability" is to be determined.
Borland 1, 788 F. Supp. at 90, Pet. App. 164a (test formulated); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 216-19 (D. Mass. 1992), Pet. App. 128a-131a (Borland II) (test
applied). If one constructed a hierarchy of abstractions for the ledger sheet portion of
Selden's accounting book, the selection of certain words as headings and the arrangement
of them and the columns under which entries would be made would seem to be at the lowest
level of abstraction. Under the District Court's methodology, this would suggest that these
aspects of the ledger sheets should be regarded as expressive.
Consistent with the second step of the District Court's methodology, one would not inquire
whether this selection and arrangement was a constituent element of a system, but rather
whether the idea of an accounting system and Selden's expression of that idea were merged.
To discern this, a court following the District Court's lead would likely examine other
accounting books available in the marketplace, just as the District Court considered the
availability of other designs for spreadsheet programs in Paperback and Borland. See, e.g.,
Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 65-69, Pet. App. 229a-235a; Borland 1H, 799 F. Supp. at 217-18,
Pet. App. 131a-132a. A study of these other accounting materials would likely reveal that
Selden's particular selection and arrangement of elements were not essential to every
expression of the idea of an accounting system, or solely dictated by the accounting functions
they were to perform. Insofar as Selden had freedom of choice about which words to use and
in what order to arrange them, under the District Court's methodology, they would likely be
treated as expressive rather than being merged with the idea of an accounting system.
In line with the third step of the District Court's methodology, one would next inquire
whether the ledger sheets were a substantial or nontrivial component of Selden's book. The
answer to this question would almost certainly be that they were a substantial part.
Because Baker's ledger sheets were substantially similar to Selden's, infringement would
probably have been found applying the District Court's methodology to the facts of Baker v.
Selden.
We see nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v. Selden to suggest that the
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Application of this test caused the District Court to conclude
that Borland had infringed Lotus' copyright because the Lotus
command hierarchy was among the more particularized elements
of the Lotus program, and many choices existed as to the selection
and arrangement of command terms, so there was no merger of
idea and expression. Borland 1I, 799 F. Supp. at 216-19, Pet. App.
131a-135a.
With all due respect to the District Court's herculean effort to
formulate an abstractions-based approach to judging infringement
in computer program copyright cases, we think the District Court
overgeneralized from the Nichols decision and failed to appreciate
the continuing viability of Baker v. Selden. As we have shown,
Baker mandates exclusion of particularized functional content, such
as systems and methods of operation, from the scope of copyright
protection in cases involving functional writings such as computer
programs. If Judge Hand did not see fit to mention the exclusion
of systems, processes, and the like from the scope of copyright
protection in Nichols, it was likely because the work at issue-a
dramatic play-was of an artistic and fanciful character. Such
works are predominantly expressive in content, and so enjoy a
broad scope of copyright protection. Only their more abstract
elements must be filtered out before an infringement analysis is
done. Since functional writings, by definition, contain not only
abstract ideas, but also uncopyrightable elements, such as proce-
dures, processes, systems, and methods of operation, the scope of
copyright protection available to such works tends to be narrower
than for artistic and fanciful works. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at
1524. The functional methods or systems in these writings must
be filtered out before assessing substantial similarity for infringe-
ment purposes, as many computer cases recognize. See, e.g., Altai,
982 F.2d at 707-711; Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 845.
Court's ruling depended on whether Selden invented his system before selecting and
arranging the columns and headings in the ledger sheets, developed the system and the
ledger sheets simultaneously, or even developed the ledger sheets first and then decided
later that they would permit people to do better accounting in accordance with a system they
suggested. The District Court seems to suggest that merger can only be found if the system
existed first and dictated the arrangement of elements. See Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 212-
13, Pet. App. 121a-123a. Nothing in Baker supports this distinction.
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The First Circuit Court was correct in asserting that it can be
misleading to employ an abstractions approach in a case such as
this one where the principal issue is whether the aspect of the
program that has been copied is or is not an integral part of an
unprotectable method or system. Borland, 49 F.3d at 815, Pet.
App. 14a-15a. It was also correct in holding, in reliance on Baker
v. Selden, that "'methods of operation' are not limited to mere
abstractions." Id. at 815-16, Pet. App. 17a. The First Circuit may
not have provided an optimal degree of guidance in distinguishing
between the unprotectable method it saw in the Lotus program and
the protectable expression in the Lotus program, but its decision is
consistent with the line of cases described above in which courts
have engaged in case-by-case assessments about elements of
computer programs that should be regarded as unprotectable
methods or processes under Baker and § 102(b).
IV. METHODS AND PROCESSES EMBODIED
IN PROGRAMS SHOULD NOT BE PRO-
TECTED BY COPYRIGHT BECAUSE
THEIR UTILITARIAN CHARACTER
MAKES THEM MORE APPROPRIATE
FOR REGULATION BY THE PATENT
SYSTEM.
A. Baker v. Selden Requires That Useful Methods and
Systems Embodied in Copyrighted Works Should
Be Protected, If At All, Only If They Meet The
Standards For Patentability.
An important factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.
Selden was Selden's apparently unsuccessful effort to secure a
patent on his bookkeeping system. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 104
(Selden had no patent); 25 L.Ed. at 841, 841 (Selden tried to get
patent). Baker's lawyer used Selden's quest for a patent to argue
that Selden's system was "a contribution to [the] useful, mechanical
art[s], not to literature." See id.
The Court agreed that Selden was trying to get indirect-
ly-through a copyright infringement action-a kind of protection
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that he had been unable to get directly from the Patent Office,
namely, an exclusive right in the system. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104-
05. As the Court explained, "[t]o give to the author of the book an
exclusive property in the [useful] art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be
a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters patent, not of copyright." Id. at 102.10 This Court has
consistently held that innovations in the useful arts that do not
meet patent law's novelty and nonobviousness standards, are, if
revealed in a publicly circulated product, freely available to be
copied by competitors. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
B. Authorities Concur With Baker That Courts Must
Defer To Patent Law To Protect Useful Methods
and Systems Depicted or Embodied in Copyrighted
Works.
The principle of deferring to patent law for protection of useful
methods and the like has been applied in a long line of copyright
cases sanctioning the right of competitors to reproduce functional
content regardless of the tangible medium in which it was first
fixed. Competitors have, for example, been allowed to copy such
things as the detailed design of a three-dimensional boiler or an
article of clothing, even though this might require making a
10 In Borland 1, 788 F. Supp. at 91, Pet. App. 167a, the District Court stated that "[tihe
mere fact that patent law allows a means of legal protection for a process ... does not
establish that there is not also some protection in copyright law." It cited the Supreme Court
decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) as a precedent recognizing an overlap of
copyright and patent protection. Mazer, however, involved a subject matter that was
potentially eligible for both copyright and design patent protection. The statuette in that
case was eligible for copyright protection as a sculpture. Because it was intended for sale
as a lamp base, it was also potentially eligible for protection as a new and original
ornamental design for an article of manufacture under design patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 171.
We do not read Mazer as recognizing an overlap of copyright and utility patent subject
matter, and we know of no precedent which recognizes the coexistence of copyright and
utility patent in the same aspect of the same work. To the contrary, several courts have
relied on Baker to reject claims of copyright infringement for aspects of a work that were the
subject of expired utility patents. See, e.g., Taylor, 139 F.2d 98. Both copyright and patent
protection can, of course, be available to computer programs, but each law protects different
aspects of programs.
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schematic representation similar to the plaintiffs design docu-
ment.1' This line of cases, now codified in 17 U.S.C. § 113(b),
reflects the general principle laid down in Baker that the exclusive
reproduction right of copyright cannot prevent-directly or indirect-
ly-the use of unprotected ideas or utilitarian features embodied in
protected works.
Baker makes clear that this principle applies to functional
writings regardless of whether they are expressed in a literary or
graphic form:
The fact that the art described in the book by illustrations of
lines and figures which are reproduced in practice in the
application of the art, makes no difference. ... Had he used
words of description instead of diagrams ... there could not be
the slightest doubt that others, applying the art to practical use,
might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams ... which he [the
author] thus described by words in his book.
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give
... an exclusive right to the methods of operation.., or to the
diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an
engineer from using them whenever occasion requires. Baker,
101 U.S. at 103.
Later commentators, including Professor Benjamin Kaplan of
Harvard, have understood this statement to recognize a privilege
to appropriate uncopyrightable content from scientific and function-
al writings. 12
1 See, e.g., Combustion Engg, Inc. v. Murray Tube Works, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239,
244 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 F. 528 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
'See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 63-66 (1967); Horace Ball,
The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 125-28, 274-78 (1944); Arthur Weil, American
Copyright Law 191, 209, 411-12 (1917). See also Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright
Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579, 600-06 (1985);
Reichman, Programs As Know-How, supra note 6, at 693 n.288; Pamela Samuelson,
Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A
Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 311, 326-27, n.70-71 (1992). But
see Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer On Copyright § 2.18[A], [B] (1995).
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The very fact that functional innovations are so valuable
explains why copyright law, with its low standards for obtaining
protection and its long duration of exclusive rights, should not
protect them. As Professor Goldstein has observed:
Functional works [such as architectural plans, legal forms,
and computer programs] depend for their value primarily on the
ingenuity, accuracy, and efficiency-the utility--of their underly-
ing system, concept or method. As a result, enforcement of
copyright in these works inevitably threatens the fundamental
precept that copyright protection shall not extend to any "idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery." Copyright in functional works is in this
respect like copyright in fact works, which pose the similar
danger of monopolizing elements that should be available for
free use by all. The important difference is that in protecting
works that are essentially functional in nature, copyright may
contradict the principle that protection for these utilitarian
elements is better left to the more exacting standards of patent
and trade secret law.
Paul Goldstein, Copyright Principles, Law & Practice § 8.5 at 116-
17 (1989). In short, Baker v. Selden consigns functional works to
a regime of "thin" protection in order to defend the line of demarca-
tion between patent and copyright law.13
A weakening of Baker v. Selden's principle of "thin" copyright
protection for functional writings would run counter to the Court's
recent decision in Feist, 499 U.S. 340. Relying in part on Baker v.
Selden, the Court ruled that a competitor could copy commercially
valuable but unprotectable facts from the plaintiffs directory. Id.
13 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102; Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 130
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (thin protection of functional works is an "open secret"); Sega, 977 F.2d at
1524 (discussing reasons that functional writings have a thinner scope of protection than
other classes of works); Altai, 982 F.2d at 704 ("compared to aesthetic works, computer
programs hover even more closely to the elusive boundary line described in § 102(b)"). See
also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1091 (1995); Mark A.
Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 High Tech. L.J. 1 (1995).
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at 350, cf. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (state law preempted by
patent law because it would have removed from the public domain
functional designs that had not undergone the patent examination
process). Moreover, Feist made clear that the rule of "thin"
copyright protection is of constitutional stature. Feist, 499 U.S. at
349-50. In the case of functional writings, the constitutional
authorization to enact legislation to promote progress in the useful
arts by granting a limited term of exclusive rights to inventors
underscores the constitutional appropriateness of limiting the scope
of copyright protection available to works depicting content that
might be patented.
C. Computer Programs Embody Many Useful Methods
and Systems That Should Be Protected, If At All, By
The Patent System.
Unlike traditional literary works, such as novels, computer
programs typically embody or implement potentially patentable
procedures, processes, systems and methods of operation. 4 Many
thousands of patents have issued for program-related inventions in
recent years, including utility patents for the following kinds of
program components: (1) algorithms applied to industrial uses, see,
e.g., Patent No. 4,744,028 (algorithm for efficient resource applica-
tion); (2) efficient data structures, see, e.g., In re Lowry, 32 F.3d
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994); (3) user interface techniques, see, e.g., Patent
No. 5,467,448 (method for adjusting the format of tables intended
for implementation in computer programs); (4) systems for
program-to-program or program-to-machine interfaces, see, e.g.,
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401
(N.D. Cal. 1993) and (5) systems for controlling the operations of
particular kinds of machines, see, e.g., In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (improved method for controlling operations of
CAT-scan machine).
14 Of course, there are many aspects of programs that both copyright and patent law
would regard as unprotectable "ideas." See, e.g., In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.
1982) (noting the Court's longstanding exclusion of "scientific principles, laws of nature,
ideas, and mental processes" from the subject matter of patent law); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(copyright's exclusion of ideas and principles).
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Patents have issued for these program elements because the
patent statute identifies processes and machines as patentable
subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent claims frequently charac-
terize the nature of the claimed invention by describing them as a
system for doing a particular task or a method of operating a device
to accomplish some task. It is no wonder, then-and no mere
coincidence either-that 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) identifies "process[es],
system[s], [and] method[s] of operation" as elements that when
embodied in works of authorship are beyond the scope of copyright.
Moreover, patents routinely recite prior methods or systems of
performing the same function in distinguishing the claimed
invention from the prior art. Because of this, the availability of
alternative choices is not by itself a reliable basis for distinguishing
between elements of a program that are expressive and those that
are excludable under § 102(b).
In recent years, courts in copyright cases involving computer
programs have become increasingly sensitive to the utilitarian
nature of computer programs and the important role patents play
in providing legal protection to computer program innovations. In
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842
(Fed. Cir. 1992), for instance, the court stated that the author of a
computer program should look to copyright law to protect the
expression in her program, but to patent law to protect the
processes or methods of operation that might be embodied in the
program. See also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 and Borland, 49 F.3d at
819, Pet. App. 23a. (Boudin, J., concurring) (noting that extending
a broad scope of copyright protection to computer programs "can
have some of the consequences of patent protection in limiting other
people's ability to perform a task in the most efficient manner").
D. The District Court Improperly Applied Copyright
To Protect Useful Methods or Systems In The Lotus
Program.
As noted above, there are some among us who are persuaded by
the First Circuit's ruling that the Lotus command hierarchy is an
unprotectable method of operating a computer to perform spread-
sheet functions. However, in the event the Court is not persuaded
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by the "method of operation" rationale employed by the Court of
Appeals, we wish to bring to the Court's attention other trouble-
some aspects of the District Court's copyright analysis in this case.
First, the District Court characterized the Lotus command
hierarchy as "a fundamental part of the functionality of keystroke
sequences and the macro language." Borland H, 799 F. Supp. at
207, Pet. App. ll0a; see also id. at 213, 219, Pet. App. 123a, 134a.
It would appear to us that a macro language and fundamental
parts of the functionality of a macro system would be beyond the
scope of copyright protection under well-established principles
deriving from Baker v. Selden and the "shorthand system" cases.
See, e.g., Brief English, 48 F.2d 555 and Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1892).lr5
Second, the District Court seemed more bothered by functional
uses of the Lotus command hierarchy by Lotus's competitors than
by informative displays of them. Compare Paperback, 740 F. Supp.
at 69, Pet. App. 237a, (suggesting it would be lawful for a compet-
ing spreadsheet product to display the Lotus commands on a help
screen to inform users about the equivalent command in the second
program, or to have a macro conversion facility such as that
provided in Microsoft's Excel product) with Borland II, 799 F. Supp.
at 219, Pet. App. 134a. ("[T]he macros and keystroke sequences are
protected to the extent that it is necessary to infringe a copyright to
use them.") (emphasis added). From the standpoint of traditional
principles of copyright law, this strikes us as backwards.
Third, in its most recent Borland decision, the District Court
found copyright infringement arising from Borland's "key reader"
feature that permitted users to use the same keystrokes to perform
the same functions as the Lotus program. Execution of program
functions through use of this feature does not involve any display
of Lotus commands or their hierarchy. Indeed, in this last decision,
the District Court seems to have found infringement based on
"originality" in the selection and arrangement of executable
" See also Samuelson, supra note 12, at 334-35 n.109 (citing commentaries critical of
concept that languages can be copyrighted).
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functions of a program. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831
F. Supp. 223, 231 (D. Mass. 1993), Pet. App. 40a-41a (Borland IV).
Finding infringement based on similarities in executable
functions comes perilously close to finding infringement based on
the fact that the two programs perform the same functions. This
is not what Congress intended when it enacted § 102(b).16 Nor is
it what Congress expected when enacting the computer program-
related amendments to the copyright statute in 1980. Congress
had been reassured by CONTU that as long as programmers wrote
their own code, it should not infringe copyright for two programs to
perform the same functions. CONTU Final Report at 21-22.
There is no question that copyright law provides protection to
the literal code of computer programs, that is, to the set of
statements and instructions that can be used in a computer to
bring about certain result. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The courts have
enforced this Congressional mandate, and the protection that
copyright has provided to program code has incented considerable
investments in software development. Copyright has also provided
protection to some detailed elements of the internal structure of
programs. See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d at 702-03. There is, however,
nothing in the Copyright Act of 1976, its legislative history, or the
computer program-related amendments to this Act added in 1980
to indicate a Congressional intent to extend copyright protection to
the functional results occurring when program instructions are
executed, such as when a program controls the operations of a
nuclear power plant or performs spreadsheet functions.17 These
functional results are processes of the sort that Congress meant to
exclude from the scope of copyright protection by enactment of
section 102(b).
" See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308,
2351 (1994) ("program behavior, in general, is unprotectable by copyright law on account of
its functionality").
17 Sometimes, of course, the results achieved by execution of program instructions will
be textual (an electronic book, for example) or pictorial (such as videogame graphics). In
such cases, courts will be able to apply traditional copyright principles when charges of
infringement arise. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672
F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding infringement because of similarities in pictorial details of
two videogames).
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If computer programs need more protection against competitive
imitation than copyright, supplemented by patent and trade secrecy
law, can provide, 8 software developers should seek additional
legal protection for computer programs from Congress. Even
though incentive-based arguments for extending copyright law to
reach all commercially valuable aspects of computer programs may
have some appeal, adopting such a rule would ultimately have "a
corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of copyright doc-
trine," as the Second Circuit so aptly noted in Altai, 982 F.2d at
712.
V. CONCLUSION
Computer programs have posed many vexing questions for
copyright law, including the difficult issues presented by the
present litigation. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
Altai: "Thus far, many of the decisions in this area reflect the
courts' attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole."
Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. Even so, courts have been making progress
in using case-by-case analysis to develop criteria for distinguishing
the expression in programs from the methods or processes that are
unprotectable by copyright law under § 102(b), just as Congress
intended. The utilitarian nature of computer programs necessarily
means that they will enjoy a narrower scope of copyright protection
than artistic and fanciful works. Useful methods and processes
embodied in or carried out by computer programs should be
regulated by patent law, not copyright. As with the exclusion of
facts from the scope of copyright by virtue of § 102(b), the exclusion
of useful methods and processes from the scope of copyright "is not
'some unforeseen byproduct of some statutory scheme . . .,' " but
"rather, 'the essence of copyright,' and a constitutional mandate."
Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted).
is See, e.g., Samuelson, et al., supra note 16, at 2342-61.
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